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Brij V. Lai
The history of the Indian indenture experience in Fiji presents us
with an apparent paradox. On the one hand, Fiji was widely reputed
to be one of the worst employers of indentured labor in the world.1
Yet, on the other hand, throughout the entire period of indenture,
between 1879 and 1920, the Indian indentured laborers mounted
few organized protests against the oppressive conditions under which
they lived and worked. It is impossible to know precisely why the
Indian laborers acted the way they did since they have left behind
few records of their own thoughts, perceptions, and experiences of
indenture. However, by using existing documentary, oral, and some
hitherto unused quantitative evidence, it is possible to suggest
reasons for their motivations and behavior.
This paper examines the social, political, economic, and legal
controls to which the indentured laborers were subjected, and argues
that the primary reason for the paucity of active protest on their part
was the authoritarian character of the plantation system in Fiji. The
frequency and effectiveness with which the employers were able to
prosecute their laborers, year after year, starkly underlined the
workers' vulnerability and reinforced the futility of overt action.
Nonresistance, thus, became a strategy for survival. But the inden-
tured laborers' difficulties were also compounded by serious problems
of organization within the nascent Indian community itself. Their
diverse social and cultural background, their differing aspirations
and motivations for migrating to Fiji, their varying individual
experiences on the plantations, and the absence of institutional
structures within the indentured community, that could have
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become avenues for mobilization, also helped to reduce the potential
for collective action.
Fiji was, to some extent, unique among the plantation colonies of
the Pacific; and contrasts with Hawai'i are particularly striking.2
Unlike Hawai'i, the sugarcane plantations in Fiji, which generated
the bulk of the colonial revenue, were run primarily by one company,
the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR) of Australia. This
monopolistic position enabled the CSR to exercise a preponderant
influence in the affairs of colonial Fiji. Again unlike Hawai'i, which
drew most of its contract laborers from China, Japan, the Philippines,
and elsewhere, Fiji relied chiefly on Indian laborers to supplement,
and eventually supplant, the dwindling supplies from neighboring
Pacific islands. This recruitment pattern bequeathed a bi-polar
demographic legacy which has long resided at the core of many
problems facing contemporary Fiji. But while the contrasts are
important, the basic experience of Fiji's Indian indentured laborers
is echoed, in more or less degree, throughout all the plantation
colonies in the Pacific and elsewhere. It is my hope that the argument
and evidence presented in this paper will provide a basis for future
comparative studies of the plantation working experience in the
Pacific islands.
BACKGROUND: INTRODUCTION OF INDIANS
The introduction of Indian laborers into Fiji began in 1879, 45
years after the system of indentured emigration from India was first
started in 1834 and five years after Fiji became a British Crown
Colony in 1874.3 Reluctantly acquired, the new colony was expected
to become economically self-sustaining in a short period of time.
Yet, neither capital nor labor, the two obvious preconditions for
rapid economic development, were readily available in the new
colony. To obtain the former, Sir Arthur Gordon, the first substantive
governor of Fiji, turned to plantation agriculture and invited the
CSR to extend its operation to Fiji, which it did in 1882, remaining
in the country until 1973. For a cheap and reliable source of labor
supply, he turned to India which was already the supplier of
indentured labor to British colonies scattered across the globe.
Altogether, between 1879 and 1916, when indentured emigration
to Fiji was finally abolished, 60,000 Indian indentured laborers were
imported into the colony, three-quarters from North India, and the
remaining from South India after 1903. Internal migration was on
the increase in the Indian subcontinent in the 19th Century, and
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most of Fiji's migrants were a part of an already uprooted peasantry
in search of employment in urban industrial centers such as Calcutta.4
Economic hardships caused by British penetration of the Indian
countryside provided the primary impetus for migration, helped
along by the recruiters' suitably embellished tales of opportunity
and wealth awaiting the recruits in Fiji and other colonies.
Several factors in the laborers' background hindered the develop-
ment of a cohesive Indian community in Fiji and severely undermined
the prospects for united action against its adversaries. To start with,
a very large proportion of the recruits were sojourners. Their
sojourner mentality was manifested in several ways, most significantly
in the yearly remittances to the family they had left behind in India.
From Fiji alone, between 1889 and 1912, the returning migrants
deposited £62,773 for transmission to India, while taking with them
jewelry and other items worth £ I I I , 9 6 2 . 5 Forty percent of the
migrants and their families eventually returned to India at the expiry
of their contracts. The desire and the pressure to save, to abide by
the rules, and to return to India at an early date were the primary
considerations in the sojourners calculations; and they acted as
powerful disincentives to any involvement in time-consuming and
potentially costly struggles against the plantation authorities.
The diverse cultural and social background of the Indian laborers
also hindered the development of common perceptions, interests, and
values among them. The laborers came from all strata of rural Indian
society. More than 300 different castes were represented in the
emigrating population who originated from more than 250 districts
in Northern India alone.6 Speaking a host of different tongues,
worshipping a multitude of different gods, and occupying widely
varying positions in the Indian social structure, they were initially
brought together at the emigration depots in Calcutta and Madras,
on the long sea voyage, and on the plantations where they lived and
worked together for five years, at the very least. Emigration across
the seas was a traumatic experience for a primarily inland people and
fragmented the values of the "old world," especially those that
emphasized adhering to tradition and maintaining group solidarity.
New values, forged in the crucible of indenture, stressed new goals:
individual achievement and personal survival. This transition from
an emphasis on communal to individual values was not precipitous.
Many social and cultural institutions survived the ordeal, but the
fundamental change in the Indians' world view was unmistakable.
The collective age of the emigrating population was another factor
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that worked against the laborers. The overwhelming majority of the
migrants, both males and females, were young: 87 percent were
under 26 years of age.7 This demographic pattern is not surprising.
The planters wanted young workers, and in India, as elsewhere,
these were the most mobile and adventuresome. But like their
counterparts in other traditional societies, these young people did
not enjoy a high status and were generally untutored and unskilled
in deeper political and cultural matters and unprepared for leader-
ship roles. The disruption of the institutions of religion, caste, and
community, which accompanied emigration and indenture, further
exacerbated their problems.
Furthermore, the laborers had little or no formal education,
certainly not in English, and this placed them at a great disadvantage
in articulating their grievances to the colonial officialdom in Fiji.
The new kind of leadership that emerged on the plantations focused
on the sirdar, or Indian foreman, and it did not serve, nor indeed was
it designed to serve, the interest of the indentured workers. The new
leadership was, in Hugh Tinker's apt phrase, "lackey leadership,"8
created and sustained by the plantation management to achieve its
goal of exercising a tight control over the labor force. As we shall see
later, the sirdars were chosen for their toughness and for their
"ability to get the immigrants to complete their tasks in the field by
methods which were anything but diplomatic."9 They often turned
out to be the indentured laborers' worst enemies. "The sirdars were
never with us,"10 recalled one indentured laborer, echoing the
sentiments of many. The absence of good leadership, then, posed a
major problem for the laborers in their struggle against the planters.
However, while these internal social and political constraints were
certainly important, it should also be recognized that harsh as
indenture was, for some immigrants, at least, it still represented an
improvement over their position in India. This was particularly the
case with the lower castes who were permanently consigned to the
fringes of rural Indian society as untouchables, tenants-at-will, and
landless laborers with little hope for betterment in this life. The
relentless pace of plantation work was nothing new to them as
strenuous physical labor was a daily condition of their lives in India.
In Fiji, at least, their individual identity was recognized and their
effort rewarded on the basis of achievement rather than traditional
status. For them, the leveling tendencies of the plantation system
heralded a welcome change that broke away from an oppressive past
and promised a brighter future in which they and their children had
a place. Others, perhaps those who had been victims of natural
calamities, such as famines and droughts, or of exploitative landlords,
welcomed the peace and security which the new environment offered
them. Indeed, for them indenture was better than the life they
encountered after they became "free." Reflecting on his indenture
days, one laborer told the anthropologist Adrian Mayer in the 1950s:
The time of indenture was better than now. You did your task, and knew that this was
all. You knew you will get food everyday. I had shipmates with me, and we weren't badly
off when there was a good sirdar and overseer. Of course, if they were bad then you had
to be careful. But now what do I do? I have cane land, bullocks and a home. Yet every
night I am awake, listening to see if someone is not trying to burn my cane, or steal my
animals. In indenture lines [estate housing] we slept well, we did not worry.11
People with such satisfying memories were probably in the minority,
but they had little reason to fight the system.
Important as the above mentioned conditions were, however, it
was the conditions within Fiji itself that posed the most serious
obstacles to the development of organizational activity among the
indentured laborers. Upon arrival in the colony, the laborers were
allotted to employers on the basis of requisitions received by the
Immigration Department. The laborers, of course, were not given
a choice of employers nor, ordinarily, the right to change them on
account of ill-treatment or any other reason. On the plantations the
movement of laborers was controlled by the overseers whose decisions
were guided not by humanitarian concerns but by the needs of the
plantation management. Occasionally families were broken up and
sent to different areas for long periods of time,12 while on some estates
laborers were constantly moved about from one place to another to
prevent alleged breaches of the peace.13 Immigration officials, at the
behest of planters, split up immigrants from the same districts of
origin to prevent the possibility of "ganging." Older, more ex-
perienced immigrants were often made to work with newer arrivals
to help them acculturate into the new way of life. The practice of
breaking up old connections and creating and fostering new social
groupings rendered the laborers vulnerable and thus more amenable
to plantation control.
The laborers were further immobilized by the fact that the
estates they worked on were widely scattered across the two main
islands of Fiji, frequently separated from each other by rugged
mountainous terrain, rivers, and generally poor communication.
Thus, a very large number of indentured laborers in different parts
of the island spent their entire indenture insulated from each other,
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without the opportunity to develop and coordinate strategies for
collective action.
Limitations imposed by geography were compounded by indenture
legislation which severely restricted mobility. An ordinance passed
in 1886,14 and in force for much of the indenture period, made it
unlawful for more than five laborers employed upon the same
plantation to absent themselves from employment for any purpose
(such as for laying complaints) without the authorization of the
employer. Anyone violating this law could be fined up to £2 or be
imprisoned up to two months. Even laborers who had completed the
required amount of work had to seek the permission of the overseer
before they could leave the plantation. The law obliged the overseer
to grant permission, but it could not compel him to issue the ticket
of absence. Without this piece of paper, any person would be
apprehended by the police or the overseers and convicted for deser-
tion. In practice, for the most part, the movement of the laborers
depended upon the goodwill of their overseers.
CSR AND THE COLONIAL OFFICIALDOM
The employers not only enjoyed great authority over their laborers
but also exercised considerable influence on the colonial government.
This was largely due to the dominance of the GSR in the colonial
economy. At first only one among several sugar companies, the CSR
was able, because of its more secure financial base and sound
management, to withstand economic vicissitudes and edge others out
of competition. By the turn of the century it was the dominant
concern in the Fijian sugar industry, with investments in excess of
£1.4. million and employing over three-quarters of all the indentured
laborers.15 From 1924 to 1973 the CSR and its wholly owned Fiji
subsidiary, the South Pacific Sugar Mills Limited, was the sole
miller of sugar cane in Fiji. The revenue-minded colonial government
had a keen appreciation of the role and the contribution of the CSR,
and the company used its dominant position as a powerful leverage
to obtain concessions and to "rely on government not to check
illegal efforts of planters and its overseers to reduce the costs of
labor."1*
Furthermore, the colonial government consistently sided with the
CSR in cases where there was dispute about work and compensation.
In 1887 Bootan, an indentured laborer, lost his hand in a mill
accident at Nausori.17 The CSR refused to pay the injured laborer
his wages and rations on the grounds that it could not be "called upon
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to help a man who will not help himself." Without his wages and
perhaps with a family to support, Bootan would have to expend his
meager savings, contract indebtedness, absent himself from work,
and have his indenture extended. The Colonial Secretary endorsed
the CSR position even while acknowledging that the injury had
"not resulted from carelessness" on Bootan's part. He wrote: "The
bare fact that a servant is injured whilst working for the master's
benefit does not impose any obligation on the master."
The government adopted a similar position on the question of
remuneration for incomplete tasks. When indentured laborers were
unable to complete tasks which themselves were widely believed even
by the colonial officials to be excessive, the CSR refused to pay them
wages, even for the completed portion of work. The Attorney
General of Fiji in 1886 offered an opinion that pleased the planters
and sanctioned their practice: "It may be stated as a general legal
proposition that if a person engages to perform a task, he forfeits all
claim to the wage: for the performance of the task is the condition
precedent to the payment of the wage."18 Later, in the 1890s,
however, with mounting evidence of overtasking and the increasing
misery among the indentured laborers, the colonial government was
forced to require employers to pay wages proportionate to the
amount of work accomplished.
Clearly, there was an identity of interest between the colonial
government and the planters, but it would be misleading to suggest a
simple collusion between the two. Some governors and immigration
officials were more sympathetic than others. Under Sir John
Thurston's tenure as governor (1888-1897), for example, initially
there was an apparent unwillingness on his part to enforce the
existing laws governing indenture. Thurston was faced, however,
with an economic depression and a precarious financial situation in
the colony, which weakened his hand in remonstrating with the
CSR.19 And he appears to have shared the planters' view of the
indentured laborers as lazy, improvident, and disinclined to work
except under close supervision and strict discipline. He therefore
came to sanction progressively more stringent controls upon the
indentured population and new repressive legislation which stipu-
lated severe penalties for even minor breaches of the labor laws.
An Ordinance passed in 189620 imposed fines of up to three shillings
per day or imprisonment for three months with hard labor if the
laborers were convicted for "unlawful absence," "lack of ordinary
diligence," and "neglect." It was made unlawful for laborers visiting
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heir employers' office or house or the office of a Stipendiary Magis-
trate or any other public official to make complaint. The punishment
for this offence was a fine of up to £i or one month's imprisonment
with hard labor. The indentured laborers could smoke outside their
dwelling houses only at the risk of being fined i o shillings or one
week's imprisonment with hard labor. Further, it was during
Thurston's tenure that the "block system" was introduced whereby
indentured laborers could be required to work on different groups
or blocks of plantations owned by the same employer. This practice
brought much hardship to the laborers for it meant longer working
hours with no additional pay, separation from friends and family,
and general uncertainty. Sensitive officials said as much, but
Thurston did not pay heed.
But perhaps the governor's most serious act of disregard for the
welfare of the laborers was retrenching the office of the Agent
General of Immigration in 1888 and amalgamating it with the office
of the Receiver-General. The services of the Immigration Depart-
ment were curtailed at a time these were most needed. Inspections
became infrequent and abuses went unrectified; and when some of
these came to light, they were not mentioned in the Annual Reports,
which themselves were not forwarded to India and to London for the
fear that a knowledge of the conditions on the Fiji plantations might
lead to the cancellation of indentured emigration to the colony.21
Other governors, however, were marginally more sympathetic to
the plight of the indentured laborers, though they all were reluctant
to inquire too closely into the affairs of the CSR. As Governor Sir
Everard im Thurn said in 1903, "I was (and am) most reluctant to
interfere with the Company's management of their own affairs, my
view being that a Governor should not interfere except on urgent
public grounds."22 In short, the colonial government did not take
seriously its role as the trustee of the indentured laborers' rights, and
this, as much as anything else, aggravated the laborers' demoraliza-
tion and engendered a lack of confidence in obtaining redress for
their grievances.
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE
In theory, the conditions of employment and the general provisions
of indenture were clearly laid out. The "Form of Agreement for
Intending Emigrants," which outlined the details, was distributed
by recruiters and sub-agents in the districts of recruitment in India.23
Among other things, it stipulated that indenture would be for five
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years, that the immigrants would be required to do work relating to
the cultivation of soil or the manufacture of products, and that they
would work five and a half days a week (Sundays and holidays being
free) at the daily rate of one shilling (12 pennies) for men and nine
pennies for women. Further, the laborers would be given the choice
of either time work (nine hours daily) or task work, the latter defined
as the amount of work an able-bodied adult could accomplish in six
and a half hours of steady work. The employers were to provide free
accommodation as well as rations for the first six months at a daily
cost of four pennies for each person over 12 years of age. Finally, the
indentured laborers could return to India at their own expense at
the end of five years, or at government expense at the end of 10 years
of "industrial residence" in the colony.
By the standards of the 19th Century, when the very notion of a
contract between an employer and an employee was largely unknown
in many parts of the world, the Agreement was a truly remarkable
document. Students of British imperial history have been at pains to
point this out in an effort to provide a more sympathetic appreciation
of the imperial position.24 The critics of indenture, on the other hand,
dismissed the document as inadequate and deceptive. For them, the
real significance of the Agreement for the indentured laborers lay
not in what was stated on paper, but rather in what was left unsaid—
especially about the social and economic realities they would
encounter in Fiji, the actual conditions of employment, and severe
penalties for breaches of the labor ordinances. The critics asserted
that deception, not voluntary agreement, had led the Indians to
enlist for Fiji, and that, if they had been fully apprised of the
conditions which awaited them in the colony, the recruits might not
have migrated.25 Deception was certainly present in the system, as
it is bound to be in most systems of labor recruitment. But it was not
the prime mover of people; the deteriorating economic condition of
the Indian countryside was.26 Would the emigrants have migrated
had they been apprised fully of the conditions that lay ahead in Fiji?
We can only speculate at the answer, but the fact that many saw
emigration as a temporary strategy to alleviate some plight at home
may suggest that a fuller knowledge of Fiji probably would not have
played a decisive role in their decision.
A more serious breach of trust occurred after the indentured
laborers arrived in Fiji where there was a great discrepancy between
legislative enactment and its enforcement by the officials of the
Immigration Department. In the first decade of indenture, a number
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of ad hoc legislative measures were passed to govern indenture. These
were consolidated into a single legislation for the first time in 1891.27
With minor subsequent amendments, this law provided the basic
framework of indenture in Fiji. It was a very thorough piece of
legislation (of 64 pages) which defined all aspects of plantation life,
from the general powers of immigration officials to the release of
prisoners and their delivery from public institutions. In practice,
however, the ideals enshrined in the legislation varied greatly from
the realities which confronted the laborers in the field.
One of the most important provisions of the Ordinance was the
creation of the Office of the Agent General of Immigration, known in
some other colonies as the Protector of Immigrants. The AGI was
required to look after the welfare of the immigrants and to ensure
that the employers fulfilled their part of the contract. But while the
AGI's responsibilities and powers were clearly defined, many factors
combined to limit the extent of his effectiveness. The retrenchment
of his office following its amalgamation with the office of the Receiver-
General was a serious blow. Much depended on the energy, diligence,
and attitude of the person who occupied the office. Some AGIs,
such as Henry Anson and John Forster, were insistent that the
planters honor their obligation to provide proper housing and medical
facilities to the immigrants, even at the risk of inviting the wrath of
their superiors. Most others, however, saw themselves as managers
of the laborers rather than as their trustees. Moreover, many of them
shared, with the planters, a deeply derogatory view of the indentured
laborers. A. R. Coates, the Agent General of Immigration in 1911,
penned a portrait of the laborers that reflected the racist ethos of the
times. The Indian indentured laborers, he wrote, were a people
"of emotional temperament [who] have low moral standards, [are]
prone to trickery, and under certain excitement to crimes of violence,
even under the discipline of continuous labor."28
Such views blunted the sensitivity of those in power toward the
laborers. Over and over again the indentured laborers were appor-
tioned a large part of the blame for the social and moral ills of
indenture, such as suicide, murder, a high infant mortality rate, and
unstable family life.29 There was also the tendency to see problems
from the point of view of the planters. When in May 1886 indentured
laborers in Koronivia struck because their tasks had been increased
from seven to ten chains (one chain is 22 yards), J. C. Carruthers,
the Sub-Agent, did not ask why the tasks had been increased but
argued, as the planters did: "The men certainly had not the shadow
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of a right to leave their work en masse and rush to Suva to complain,
without so much as putting shovel to ground to see whether they
could do the 10 chain task." Among the remedies Carruthers
recommended for stopping future strikes were: a liberal use of
corporal punishment (which "would no doubt have a marvelous
effect upon habitual idlers"); infliction of heavier fines than the
maximum three shillings provided by law; limiting the option of fine
in favor of imprisonment; making prison work tougher ("let hard
labor be hard labor"); and instituting a system of random checks for
leave of absence tickets. The planters could not have asked for a
better ally than Carruthers.30
The AGI's main contacts with the indentured laborers in the field
were the District Medical Officers (DMOs) and Inspectors of
Immigrants. The Labor Ordinance required all planters to provide
adequate medical facilities to the laborers under their control. The
DMOs were expected to visit the plantation hospitals regularly and
to inspect "the supply of water for and the rationing of any such
immigrants in such hospital and the supply of clothing, bedding,
furniture, medicine, medical comforts and medical and surgical
appliances." They were empowered to impose a penalty of up to
£10 on planters who failed to provide full amenities to the laborers.31
The reality was somewhat different. The Annual Report of 1894 noted:
The efficiency of the medical care required by the law is somewhat hampered by the
expense (a serious one on small plantations) of maintaining a competent hospital attendant,
the want of a working standard of competence and the absence of any control over this
class of estate official by the DMO.32
How effective were the occasional inspection visits of the District
Medical Officers? One indentured immigrant recalled:
We were never told about the arrival of the big doctor. Once or twice a year, a new
sahib would suddenly appear, peep into our rooms, shake his head, lift his nose to smell
something, point to the overgrown grass to the accompanying sahib, talk very fast gesturing
at our toilets, and then walk away smartly. Sometimes he would ask us whether we liked
the place. We would complain about the overcrowded room, about theft, about heavy
work, and other hardships. Once he was gone, our complaints remained only complaints
and nothing came out of them.33
The inspectors, whose job was to enforce the employers compliance
with the provisions of the Labor Ordinance, also functioned with
partial effectiveness. Again, much depended upon the integrity and
diligence of the individual inspectors. Some were admirably persistent
in investigating the laborers' complaints, but many were not. They
came from the ranks of the CSR overseers and generally shared their
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values and interests. K. L. Gillion, the historian of Fiji indenture,
writes that the Indians had "no confidence in most of the inspectors."
He goes on to argue:
. . . inspectors shared much of the outlook and attitudes of the overseers, and it is not
surprising that the employers were generally satisfied with their work. Although there
were several instances of friction between employers and inspectors, usually the Europeans
of a particular locality belonged to the same social circle, the government officers being
dependent on the employers and overseers for fellowship, and on the companies for meat,
ice, and transport for their families. The road to ease and even promotion did not lie
along the way of trouble-making.34
Even the more assiduous inspectors conceded the hopelessness of
their task. As one official noted in 1892, it was only a few cases in
which the inspector could "induce the employer to give relief,
knowing even then that the relief will only be temporary and his
interference be bitterly though silently resented."35 And there were
many means by which the overseers could pressure their employees
to withhold evidence from the inspectors. One indentured laborer
recalled being told by an overseer:
You know, we white men can find out things quickly. But before we can find out, your
sirdar will find out about your reports. He has got friends among you. You should be
able to guess what the outcome will be if you pinch the serpent. You have to work under
me all the time. Don't spoil your chances of survival in five minutes talk.36
For many immigrants, then, the key to an untroublesome future lay
in complying with the wishes of the overseers and sirdars, not in
creating trouble for them.
Even magistrates showed a conscious or unconscious disposition to
favor the planters.37 They deliberately stuck to the letter of the law,
even in circumstances where the evidence was far from conclusive.
This was especially the case in complaints about task work. The
Agreement which the laborers had signed in India had stated the
possibility of both time as well as task work. But soon after the
introduction of Indians into the colony, a change had been effected
in Fiji which practically abolished the alternative of task work from
the very beginning,38 a significant alteration which was not brought
to the attention to potential recruits in India. When the laborers
sought a legal clarification of their understanding, they were fined
for absence from work and had their indentures extended. As one
magistrate in Lautoka stated in 1903: "I can only assume as before
stated that they, one and all, perfectly understand the terms and
conditions of their contract and pains and penalties attaching thereto
for non-fulfilment."39
Excessive penalties, too, were common. A. R. Coates wrote in
1910:
. . . instances have been brought to the notice of His Excellency the Governor of excessive
or improper penalties being awarded for minor breaches of the Ordinance that by some
magistrates views are held in regard to the position and liability of an indentured immigrant,
that are not in accordance with the letter or the intention of the law.40
The system of colonial justice, even government officials were forced
to conclude, was double-faced for the indentured laborers.
LABORERS' COMPLAINTS AGAINST EMPLOYERS
Further evidence of this is provided in the startling discrepancy
between the extent to which the indentured laborers and their
employers were able to use the courts to enforce the Labor Ordinance.
Table I,41 compiled by this author from figures in the Annual Reports,
gives an indication of the nature and volume of charges the inden-
tured laborers, both males and females, brought against their
employers. Several things stand out. The first is the extremely small
number of complaints which the laborers laid against the employers.
TABLE 1
INDENTURED LABORERS' COMPLAINTS AGAINST EMPLOYERS
Tears
Complaints
1886 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 Total
Assault and Battery 29 18 6 7 8 28 14 36 40 186
Non-Payment of Wages — 3 6 7 12 10 25 15 19 97
Not Providing Tools — — — — 2 — — 2 — 4
Not Supplying Rations — — — — — — — — 1 1
Not Providing Work — — — — 1 2 — — 3 6
Using Insulting Language — — — — — 1 — — 1 2
Requiring Work Illegally — — — — — — 2 1 — 3
Falsifying Pay-list — — — — — — 3 — — 3
Failure to take delivery of
discharged prisoner — — — 1 — — — — — 1
Miscellaneous 1 — — — — — — — — 1
Overtasking — — — 1 — — — — — 1
Withdrawn — — — 1 1 — 1 — 3 6
Dismissed 18 8 5 16 21 34 30 36 35 203
Convicted 12 13 7 1 3 7 15 18 32 108
2 0 0
Indeed, there were some years in the 1880s in which the laborers
were unable to lay any complaints at all. The paucity of the com-
plaints, however, was no indication of the plight of the indentured
laborers. As one official noted in 1892:
That there are no or few complaints is no more an indication of perfect satisfaction than
the paucity of departmental prosecutions of employers is an indication of a careful and
conscientious observance of the law and their obligation by the latter.42
Laying a complaint against an employer was a serious "offence"
and entailed great risks for the indentured laborer. It involved
absence from work and therefore loss of pay, the extension of
indenture by the days the immigrant was absent, and the wrath of
the overseers. There were also instances of laborers being prevented
from reporting abuses to the inspectors. These were especially com-
mon in isolated areas such as Labasa where, wrote Sergeant Mason
in 1897, "it is a usual thing for Indians to come to the police station
between the hours of 9 and 12 at night to complain of the treatment
they get on some of the plantations."43 But perhaps a more important
reason why the laborers reported so few complaints was the "uncer-
tainty of relief" :44 after taking all the risk, to see the accusations
against the overseers discharged or the overseers fined lightly, as
often happened, or to witness the reluctance of the Immigration
Department to press charges even in the face of solid evidence against
the employers. Another striking feature illustrated by Table I is the
surprisingly low conviction rate of the employers, which is in marked
contrast to the conviction rate of the laborers, as we shall see later.
The main reasons for this are not difficult to find: the laborers'
ignorance of the law, inexperience in conducting their cases, fre-
quently without any assistance from the Immigration Department,
and, as mentioned above, the prejudice of the colonial judiciary in
favor of the planters. Their cases also broke down because the
overseers were able to bribe or coerce other laborers to give testimony
in their favor.45
Assault and battery were the major complaints of the laborers,
accounting for 61 percent of all the charges. To some extent, this is
not really surprising since violence, coercion, and control are an
integral part of the plantation system. As Eric Wolf has pointed out,
a plantation is "an instrument of force, wielded to create and
maintain a class-structure of workers and owners, connected hierar-
chically by a staff-line of overseers and managers."46 Race also
contributed its own share, not so much in causing violence to the
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indentured workers as in blunting sensitivity to it. All the planters
and overseers were white, while the laboring force was colored,
members of an assumed inferior race whose own best interests were
served by being kept under white tutelage.
Employer violence was rampant in Fiji at the turn of the century.
Governor Sir Everard im Thurn noted in 1907 that "the habitual
attitude of many of the overseers towards the immigrants under
them is, to put it plainly, brutal,"47 and he legislated stiffer penalties
for the "ill-use" of immigrants. A few years earlier an official had
noted that if "assault convictions mean that a man is a bad character
then nearly all the officers of the company (CSR) are bad charac-
ters."48 It was on mechanically-run CSR plantations in such remote
areas as Labasa and Ba that overseer violence was especially bad.
The overseers were assisted by sirdars, described by one scholar as
the "lynchpin of the system."49 As already mentioned, the sirdars were
chosen for their unquestioning loyalty and willingness to serve the
plantation management. The relationship between the overseer and
his sirdar was one of mutual self-interest. An effective overseer needed
a loyal and strong sirdar, while the latter needed the ear of his master.
The threat of dismissal or relegation to field labor was a powerful
incentive to please the management. The position also brought power
and influence in the indentured community, and the sirdars used
these effectively to enhance their own interests. They were allowed
to own stores on the plantations, and, as one official pointed out,
"to those who have a knowledge of the conditions on the plantation,
it is unnecessary to state how pressure can be put on an immigrant
by the sirdar to compel him to deal at his store."50 They extorted
money from immigrants and even forced laborers in their charge to
work free for them on Saturdays and Sundays.51 Many interfered
with indentured women, and some even engaged in sexual traffick-
ing.52 There was at least one instance when a sirdar participated in
the murder of a man who had caused trouble for his overseer.53
The indentured laborers found it extremely difficult to obtain
convictions for assault and battery despite clear evidence of physical
injury inflicted by overseers. A case in point is overseer H. E.
Forrest's assault on his cook, Thermadu, because the breakfast curry
had not been prepared to the overseer's satisfaction.54 Thermadu
had evidence of physical injury on his body: a black eye and a long
cut over his left temple. Forrest, of course, denied the assault, and
was able to call two sirdars to support his evidence. His counsel
"practically put the words into the mouths of all the witnesses for the
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defence who were not cross-examined nor examined by the court."
The charge was dismissed, despite the fact that Thermadu's testimony
was "sound and practically unshaken by rigid cross-examination by
counsel and court." This was not an isolated incident. As John
Forster had correctly remarked seven years earlier in 1900:
There have been too many cases where the complainants have the evidence of violence
on their bodies and yet could not prosecute successfully. It is obvious that where violence
is resorted to on a plantation and goes lightly punished, the victims might often be
unable to prove their case and are under strong inducement to abstain from complaint
or to withdraw complaints made.55
While the assault and battery cases were very difficult to prosecute,
it was especially difficult to convict European overseers. As figures in
Table II show,56 only one-third of the overseers were successfully
prosecuted. Even when the overseers were convicted, the penalty
was light. They usually escaped with small fines, hardly ever
imprisonment, especially before the turn of the century. Some
employers even thought the transfer of the offending overseer to
another estate was a sufficient punishment in itself.57 The sirdars, too,
got away with light fines, and some even with a history of previous
TABLE II
CONVICTION RATE FOR EUROPEAN OVERSEERS
Tear JVo. of Charges Convictions Withdrawn}Dismissed % Convicted
1897 64 32 32 5°
1898 7 4 3 57
1899 10 4 6 40
1900 2 — 2 0
1901 5 1 4 20
1902 14 6 8 43
1904 37 9 28 24
1905 20 4 16 20
1907 35 8 27 23
1908 30 8 22 27
1909 29 7 22 24
1910 39 5 34 13
1911 48 14 34 29
1912 62 22 40 35
Total 402 124 (30.8%) 278 (69.2%) Av. 28.9
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Convictions were re-employed, in spite of the remonstrance of the
Immigration Department.58 In open defiance of the law, some
overseers publicly returned their sirdars' fines, and the "fact of such
return has been made known to the immigrant laborers,"59 further
undermining their confidence in the efficacy of colonial justice and
reminding them, if, indeed, any reminder was needed, of who had
the last laugh.
The nonpayment of wages constituted the second largest ground
for the laborers' complaint against the employers. The Agreement
the indentured laborers had signed in India had promised a daily
wage of one shilling for men and nine pennies for women. This was
the maximum pay the laborers could make under ideal conditions,
but these hardly obtained on the Fiji plantations. In fact, it was not
until 1908, 28 years after indenture had begun in Fiji, that adult
males were able to earn an average wage of one shilling per working
day.60 Sickness, absence, non-completion of tasks, and other such
factors explain why the indentured laborers were unable to earn the
maximum pay for such a long period of time.
The greed of the planters also played a part. Some of them devised
their own tactics to retain a portion of the laborers wages as punish-
ment for absence without their approval. In some places the planters
used the practice of "double cut" by which they docked two days
pay for each day the laborer was away from work. Others disregarded
the rules for the time when the wages had to be paid. The Immigra-
tion Ordinance required the payment of all wages on the Saturday
of each week after noon, or, if this was not possible because of bad
weather or public holidays, on the first available working day of the
following week after working hours.61 In practice, however, different
estates paid their workers at different times, depending on the
convenience to the employer. On some estates only fully earned wages
were paid weekly, others being paid at the end of the month. Thus,
an immigrant who had a dispute about the amount of work com-
pleted in the first week had to wait until the end of the month before
he could take any action. His disadvantage vis-a-vis the employer
increased with each day. Inspector Hamilton Hunter noted:
This delay confuses the immigrant as to time, and he has merely his own vague recollection
of day and date to lay before the courts, whereas the employer has his field book and
paysheet to produce, and these are taken in evidence that the task was either badly done
or not completed.62
Once again, the powerlessness of the indentured laborers was starkly
underlined.
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It is remarkable that for the years included in Table I, in only one
year (1892) was there a single charge for overtasking laid against
the employers. This is especially surprising in view of the universal
complaint of overtasking among the laborers.63 Overtasking was the
major cause of the Koronivia strike of 1886. A task, it will be recalled,
was supposed to be the amount of work an able-bodied laborer could
accomplish in six and a half hours of steady labor. In practice, as the
Immigration Department officials themselves conceded, tasks were
frequently set by overseers on the basis of the amount of work a few
hand-picked men could do.64 As one official wrote in 1886:
I believe that they are being pushed too hard and think that a proper man should pass
the greater part of his time on the river and go about constantly and examine all tasks
and assist Indians in prosecuting employers.65
Yet prosecutions for overtasking were virtually non-existent. The
main reason for this was the absence of a precise definition of what
constituted an acceptable amount of task work. Wrote one official:
The indefinitiveness of the legal definition obviously leaves the limits of a fair task entirely
an open question and a matter of opinion, and supposing a prosecution for overtasking
can be and is instituted, the weight of opinion is found on the side of skilled evidence the
employer can bring forward in his favour as against the evidence of an ignorant coolie.
The court has to decide on evidence not on the private opinion of the presiding magistrate.67
The "ignorant coolie," of course, was fully aware of this reality.
When redress could not be obtained for overtasking, it was pointless
to complain.
EMPLOYERS' COMPLAINTS AGAINST LABORERS
In contrast to the indentured laborers, the planters enjoyed
astounding success in prosecuting a very high percentage of their
workers. Every year, as Table III shows,67 they laid complaints
against a very large proportion of the indentured population. Both
men and women were complained against, though in a number
of years proportionately more women were complained against than
indentured men. Women constituted a more vulnerable segment of
the indentured population. They absented or were forced to absent
themselves from work more often than men on account of the
pressure of domestic work, pregnancy, child rearing, and sickness,
and thus accumulated a higher rate of complaints against themselves.68
Some areas were worse than others. Labasa stands out, as it did in
many other respects also. The situation there was especially bad
during the 1890s. In 1895, 96 percent of the total indentured
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TABLE III
PERCENTAGE OF MALE AND FEMALE WORKERS COMPLAINED AGAINST
No. Males and Females/100 Adults No. of Total Charges
Tear
Males Females Males Females
1897 73.8 26.2 65.2 34.8
1898 74.3 25.7 69.4 30.6
1899 73.9 26.1 67.3 32.7
1900 73.9 26.1 61.7 38.3
1901 72.8 27.1 56.2 43.8
1902 72.7 27.3 70.3 29.7
1903 74.2 25.8 75.4 24.6
1904 72.0 28.0 76.8 23.2
1905 73.5 26.5 76.0 24.0
1906 73.4 26.6 73.5 26.5
1907 74.7 25.3 70.5 29.6
Average 73.6 26.4 69.3 30.7
population was complained against; in 1896, 68 percent; in 1898,
90 percent; and in 1899, 68 percent. Most of the complaints were
successfully prosecuted. Ba was a distant runner-up. The highest
percentage of complaints ever laid there was in 1895, or 50 percent.69
The reasons for the differences among the different districts are not
explained in the Annual Reports, but they are not difficult to guess.
Labasa was far away, on the island of Vanua Levu, inspections of
plantations were less frequent there, and the planters exercised much
greater control over their laborers.
The Labor Ordinance provided a very large number of offences for
which the employers could prosecute their laborers. The offences for
which the most number of convictions were obtained are shown
in Table IV.70 In the light of what has been said above, most of
the charges are unexceptional, though the fact that the employers
were able to obtain convictions in 82 percent of all the charges
they laid while the indentured laborers were able to obtain convic-
tions in only 35 percent of the cases (Table II) starkly underlines
the inescapable conclusion about who held sway on the plantations.
In many instances the indentured laborers were convicted for





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































they were brought before the courts. The prosecution for "committing
a nuisance" (defecating) underlines the point well. The Labor
Ordinance provided:
. . . any person who shall commit any nuisance [i.e., defecate] within sixty yards of any
stream running through or any thoroughfare running through or adjoining any planta-
tion shall on conviction in a summary way forfeit any sum not exceeding ten shillings
[more than a week's pay] or be imprisoned for any term not exceeding one month.71
Were the indentured laborers ever notified about this provision?
What was the nature of the "evidence" presented in court? The
record is unclear on this point. But even if we accept that the laborers
heeded the calls of nature in the open fields, it is still astonishing that
the employers were able to lay complaints under this category, while
the indentured laborers were unable to lay charges for overtasking.
It is difficult to believe that planters who laid such complaints were
serious in their intent to prosecute and obtain charges. In the context
of the plantation experience in Fiji, it was more likely a tactic to
harass and intimidate those indentured laborers whom the overseers
could not prosecute under any other category.
Many other provisions of the Labor Ordinance were also vague
and placed a great deal of power in the hands of the planters. The
indentured laborers could be prosecuted, fined, or imprisoned for
using "Threatening and Insulting Language;" for "Threatening
Behaviour;" and for "Refusal and Neglect to Go to Hospiial"
(laborers were not paid while they were hospitalized). Many were
convicted for "The Want of Ordinary Diligence," which was decided
by the overseers who set excessive tasks in the first place. The planters
viewed the laborers who did not complete the assigned work as
malingerers who needed to be worked through firm discipline. Were
these workers really as lazy as the planters made them out to be?
One official noted in 1882:
The fact remains that cases were brought to notice, and more possibly escaped notice,
in which immigrants were committed to prison for the non-performance of acts that they
were not capable of performing, and in more than one instance the condition of the
immigrants was found to be such on entering gaol as to necessitate their speedy relegation
to hospital.72
Unlawful absence by far comprised the largest source of planter
complaints against the indentured laborers. It was defined as absence
by truancy, detention in gaol, and even attendance at court. It is
doubtful that the indentured laborers deliberately absented them-
selves from work, knowing that it meant loss of pay, fine, or even
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imprisonment. It is more likely that they did so because they were
unable to work due to sickness, debility, and hospitalization. Perhaps
many were also marked absent because they turned up to work late:
a normal working day began at the crack of dawn. Desertion was
narrowly defined: absence "without lawful excuse for three whole
days exclusive of Sundays or lawful holidays." A deserter was subject
to arrest without warrant wherever he or she was found, and faced
a penalty of fine up to £2 or imprisonment not exceeding two
months. The alternative of imprisonment was abolished in 1912,
though a person convicted three times for desertion could face a fine
of up of ,£5 or three months of imprisonment.73
Immigration officials always saw desertion as a deliberate act of
defiance. It was seen in 1885, for example, as a tendency "on the
part of a limited number of dissipated, dissatisfied and vicious coolies
to desert from indentured service in order to indulge in gambling,
prostitution, or seclusion and idleness."74 Desertion was, indeed, a
strategy some indentured immigrants used when other means of
seeking redress had failed. And they did so in the open. As the
Immigration Inspector in Ba reported in 1900:
The intention of desertion has usually been avowed beforehand, at the time of making
the complaint in the most stubborn and determined manner . . . it was planned and
systematized protest against assault [by overseers and sirdars].75
Whether the desertions were deliberate or unintended, the fact that
it was so pervasive made a serious indictment of the indenture system.
The Immigration officials, of course, rarely thought that the inden-
tured laborers might have a genuine reason for deserting their
employers.
Indentured laborers convicted of breaching the Labor Ordinance
could either be fined or imprisoned. Neither, however, was the end
of punishment for the indentured laborer, for the planters were
legally entitled to recover lost work by extending the contract of
workers by the number of days they were absent from the plantation.
The extent to which the employers were able to use this provision
is shown in Table V.76 The indentures of both men and women
were extended, though there was a decline in the proportion of
extensions over the years. Around the turn of the century propor-
tionately more women than men had their indentures extended;
however, the extensions for men were for a much longer period.
These extensions pointed to the same general conclusion as the high
prosecution rate of the indentured laborers, the violence of the
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TABLE V
EXTENSION OF INDENTURE FOR M E N AND WOMEN WHOSE CONTRACT EXPIRED
Women Men
Year
Total Expired Extended % Days Total Expired Extended % Days
1898 145 67 46 1213 363 169 47 6705
1899 183 69 38 1690 491 176 36 6835
1900 277 127 46 1984 739 315 43 16417
1901 251 141 56 3293 660 252 43 11454
1902 309 148 48 2976 798 321 40 11208
1904 211 111 53 2399 564 169 30 11085
1905 524 276 53 6097 1254 5OO 40 32404
1906 587 169 29 2336 1385 539 39 31581
I9°8 358 125 35 1577 1014 386 38 31851
1909 204 40 20 779 630 178 28 22925
1910 577 129 22 2581 1648 437 27 19917
1911 445 88 20 1819 1379 303 22 22859
1912 407 76 19 2814 1314 333 25 36748
1913 415 45 11 291 1259 3*6 25 8694
1916 682 38 5 783 2061 287 14 20516
overseers, and the indifference of the colonial government did:
protest did not pay.
This paper has attempted to highlight those factors that stifled
protest in the Indian indentured community. It has focused especially
on the actions of the planters and the colonial government, which
were the primary deterrents of collective action in the Indian
community. But to leave the impression that there was no protest
whatsoever would be misleading. Powerless as they were, the inden-
tured laborers did resist, in their own ways, undue pressures that
were put on them, though a full discussion of this is beyond the scope
of this paper. There were two strikes in the Rewa region in the 1880s
and one in Labasa in 1907, the latter led by Punjabi immigrants.
Some laborers attempted desertion, as we have seen, hoping perhaps
to submerge themselves in the free Indian community slowly
emerging on the fringes of the plantations. Some vented their rage
on the crops and tools of the employers, feigned illness, and absented
themselves from work in protest against the system. Others, fed up
with the constant drudgery of work and the hopelessness of their
situation, took their own lives through suicides, while a few avenged
2 1 0
acts of injustices against them by murdering their overseers and
sirdars.
Such acts of violence might strike temporary terror in the hearts
of the overseers or raise concern in official circles. But they posed
little threat to the planters and the colonial officialdom. In the end,
the Indian indentured laborers chose nonresistance as their method
of coping with their situation. This was not as strange a strategy as it
might appear at first glance, for as Eugene Genovese has written of
the slaves in America:
If a people, over a protracted period, finds the odds against insurrection not merely long
but virtually uncertain, then it will choose not to try. To some extent this reaction
represents decreasing self confidence and increasing fear, but it also represents a conscious
effort to develop an alternative strategy for survival.77
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